This paper examines a change in the level of competition in the Japanese life insurance industry over the last 17 years. We estimate the first order condition for profit-maximizing insurance oligopolies to obtain the degree of non-competition and collusion. Estimation results suggest that: 1) not only stock companies, but also mutual companies maximize their own profits rather than pay out dividends to policyholders; 2) competition has become stronger since 1995; 3) revision of Insurance Industry Law and failures of insurance companies promoted the competition; and 4) the competition in the recent years is still more lax than the pre-war period.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the Japanese life insurance industry has become more competitive in the last 17 years. The financial liberalization introduced in the 1970s has not resulted in increased competition in the traditional banking, securities, and insurance industries (see Ikeo, 1995; Horiuchi, 1999) . Liberalization in the insurance industry in particular is lagging behind that of the other financial industries. The level of competition and the economic efficiency of the life insurance industry have thus been considered low. A huge literature considers the efficiency, productivity, and the economies of scale and of scope in the life insurance industry.
2 These studies, however, mainly focus on US firms. Few analyses are known regarding Japanese life insurance firms. Tsutsui et al. (1992) and Kitasaka (1996) analyzed scale and scope economies in the Japanese life insurance industry for 20 incumbent firms. Fukuyama (1997) considered the efficiency and productivity growth in the Japanese life insurance industry during the period 1988 . McKenzie (2002 estimated the 1 Chuma et al. (1993) examined the technical efficiency of Japanese life insurance companies. They reported that efficiency differs substantially between insurance companies and that it does not depend on the form of the company, i.e., whether it is a mutual or stock company. 2 Cummins and Weiss (2000) surveyed papers on these topics focusing on the studies using modern frontier efficiency methodologies in both the life and property-liability insurance industries.
competitive indexes are examined. Fourthly, the recent degree of competition is compared with that which existed in the pre-war period. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions.
2. The Japanese Life Insurance Industry from 1986 to 2002
The life insurance business under the Bubble Economy and the Heisei Depression
The period from 1986 to 2002, which we analyze in this paper, consists of the bubble period and the long stagnation. The purpose of the analysis is to evaluate to what extent liberalization proceeded in these 17 years and how the non-competitive situation, which was dominant throughout the post-war period, has changed. We need to be careful that the dramatic movements in Japanese business conditions over these 17 years do not in fact conceal a long-term structural change, if such exists.
The Japanese economy enjoyed a boom, the so-called 'Bubble Economy', in the late 1980s.
However, after the stock price bubble burst in 1990 and the land price bubble did likewise in 1991, the Japanese economy fell into a long period of stagnation called 'the Heisei Depression'.
In Figure 1 , we show the GDP growth rate and the growth rate of the value of policies in force over the whole life insurance industry. The GDP growth rate has been close to zero since 1992.
While it rose temporarily in 1995 and 1996, it fell to a negative figure in 1998, and except for 2000 remained negative. Figure 1 shows that the contrast between the boom in the late 1980s and the depression in the 1990s is even more pronounced for the life insurance industry.
Specifically, whilst the annual growth rate of the value of policies in force was over 10% in the late 1980s, it declined and reached -10% in 1997 and was negative in consecutive years thereafter except for 2001. Figure 2 shows the change in the current profit rate as the current profit/asset ratio of the corporate sector for all industries and of the life insurance industry for the same period.
Whereas the profit rate of the whole industrial sector declined from the 1980s to the 1990s, the decline of that rate within the life insurance industry was much larger, as that sector deteriorated more than the average for the whole of the sector. The profit rate of the life insurance business was less than 1% after 1993, whereas that for the whole of industry was greater than 2%.
It is not easy to discover the reasons for this deterioration in the life insurance sector during the 1990s. There is no doubt, however, that the long-term contracts of companies were one cause. Life insurance contracts imply the collection of a premium and payments of claims over a couple of decades, however revenues were not necessarily invested in equivalent long-term assets. Insurance companies thus assumed interest rate variation risks. Such risks were realized in the depression following an unanticipated fall in interest rates when the average for a loan fell from 7.6% in 1991 to 1.9% in 2001.
In Figure 3 , the change in yield of assets and the assumed interest rate are shown. The assumed interest rate is the expected return on the assets of the company considered in setting the insurance premium rate. To maintain solvency, the assumed interest is set at a lower level than the premium rate, and the ex-post gain is distributed to policyholders as dividends. In Figure 3 , data on the yield of assets are taken Iguchi, 1996) . The revision of the Law in 1996 was aimed at keeping pace with an expected transition from the regulated system to a liberalized one.
In the post-war period, financial institutions, banking, securities, and insurance companies, have been segregated from each other. Although in 1993 banks and securities companies were allowed to enter each other's domain by creating subsidiaries, the insurance sector has been kept isolated from the other industries. Deposit interest rates were thoroughly deregulated in 1993 and 1994, and the trade commissions for stocks trading were deregulated in 1998 and 1999. However, the rates of non-life insurances were not deregulated until 2001, and the premium and dividend rates of the life insurance industry still seem to be under the control of the authorities. Essentially, the insurance industry has been left behind by the financial liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s, so that it has remained uncompetitive.
The most remarkable change in the life insurance industry was brought about by the revision of the Insurance Industry Law. The new law permitted mutual entry between life and non-life companies through the establishment of subsidiaries. 5 Thereafter, a series of failures and mergers of small and medium-sized firms occurred. Whilst the large number of new entrants in 1996 suggests an improvement in competition, the increase in the Herfindahl index after 1996 suggests that, if we rely upon the standard 'market structure-performance hypothesis', the degree of competition decreased. The 'efficiency structure hypothesis' proposed by Demsetz (1973) , however, contrarily predicts that the increase in the Herfindahl index is caused by the enhanced competition. We will examine which scenario is really the case by conducting a regression analysis in section 4.3.
The Model

The basic model
In this section, we derive a model to estimate the degree of competition. 8 First, let us introduce the variables used in this paper. is the value of the policies in force, , is premium income, represents claims paid, represent dividends paid, is outstanding assets, represents yields of assets, and is operating costs. Subscripts and represent firm i and period . Then, the profits
where is the inverse demand function for life insurance, is the cost function of firm , and stands for the change in reserve of firm . Here we assume that
dividends and the mean of claims to be paid are known to policyholders, so that they regard the net premium as the price of a policy. 9 Subtracting claims paid at the definition of the price of an insurance policy implies that, with this price, the policyholders buy a reduction of the risk of future income variation by their death.
The stock insurance company i chooses to maximize the profits, given , r , and .
10 From the first order condition of the profit maximization, we obtain:
where
is the price elasticity,
is the market share of firm and
is assumed to be common for all the firms and is denoted as µ t in order to capture the industry average degree of competition.
11
We estimate (2) together with the cost function because marginal cost, MC, is not observable. We assume a translog cost function:
where w is the wage rate of the finance and insurance industries and p is the deflator of fixed capital formation. These data are not available for each firm, so we use the data which vary only over time. p w q ln and , ln , ln are deviations from their means. 12 We allow for 9 In reality, dividends and claims will be paid in future periods. In our one-period analysis, this aspect is disregarded. 10 We assume that profits gained at period t are added into assets and are invested at period t+1. 11 See Bresnahan (1989) for this point. 12 Using deviations from the means in the translog function is a convention to avoid possible multi-colinearity.
time-variant intercepts
, firm-specific intercepts and firm-specific slopes . The ratio of group insurance and the ratio of saving insurance are added to the cost function to eliminate the effect of the composition of various kinds of policies. The expected signs of and are negative and positive, respectively (see Tsutsui et al., 1992) .
Substituting the definition of marginal cost, equation (2) now becomes:
Here, and are added to the first order condition to eliminate the effect of the composition of various kinds of policies. The signs of and are not known a priori.
We estimate equations (3) and (4) simultaneously, putting the restriction on the parameters over the equations.
We obtain the estimate of t t η µ , but t µ cannot be identified. Thus, we evaluate the possible change in t µ , assuming that η t is constant over the estimation period. Multiplying µ t with market share, we get the degree of non-competition t λ (Bresnahan, 1982) . In order to distinguish µ t from t η , we conduct another analysis, putting a restriction on the conjectural variations (Clarke and Davies, 1982; Alley, 1993) . Specifically, we assume that when firm increases its production by a certain rate, the other firms increase α-times
α t ) of that rate. Thus, for all and for all i j i ≠ :
13 An increase in savings life insurance results in an increase in premium income. However, it also leads to an increase in the amount of the policy paid, so that the sign of is not determined. 
If α t equals unity, (5) means that firm predicts that other firms will respond to an increase of firm 's production so as to keep the share of every firm unchanged. Alternatively, if i i α t equals zero, it means that firm predicts that other firms will not respond at all to its increase in production. This model corresponds to a cooperative game, in which i α t represents the degree of collusion. The former case is interpreted as perfect collusion and the latter corresponds to non-cooperative Cournot competition.
The concept of conjectural variation is popular in both applied theoretic and empirical industrial organization. Theorists of industrial organization, however, take a dim view of its ad hoc assumptions about the conduct of firms, its lack of a game-theoretical foundation, and the forcing of dynamics into an essentially static model in which the strategy space and the time horizon of the underlying game are only loosely defined (Fellner, 1949; Friedman, 1983, p.110; Daughety, 1985; Makowski, 1987; and Tirole, 1989, pp. 244-245) . These shortcomings are often perceived as the cost that the modeler must pay for realism without compromising simplicity and tractability. However, it is fortunate that Dockner (1992) , Cabral (1995) , and Pfaffermayr (1999) showed that the concept of conjectural variation can be supported by a consistent theoretical foundation if it is considered a reduced form of a dynamic game. 14 Their findings can be used to justify a static conjectural variations analysis for both modeling dynamic interactions and estimating the degree of oligopoly power. From the same viewpoint, we believe that the use of the static model is rationalized by considering it as a reduced form of an (unmodeled) dynamic game.
Summing up (5) over all , we obtain:
When α t = 0 ,
, corresponding to the case of Cournot competition. Assuming that
µ is constant over , and substituting (6) into (4), we obtain, instead of (4):
3.3 The objective of mutual insurance companies Two ownership structures, mutual and stock, coexist in the life insurance industry, since life insurance was started as mutual aid. Thus, the question: 'Which is the better organizational form, a stock or a mutual company?' has been the concern of much research.
15 For example, Mayers and Smith (1986) examined the relative efficiency of a stock versus a mutual-ownership structure from the perspective of the agency cost approach. Using the data of 30 companies changing from a stock to a mutual structure, they concluded that this change is on average efficiency-enhancing, whereas Spiller (1972) concluded that the mutual company is less efficient. Mayers et al. (1997) examined the relationship between board structure and organizational forms and found that mutual companies employ a significantly larger fraction of outside directors than do stock companies. These studies, however, mainly focus on US firms.
Nevertheless, quite a few consider the Japanese life insurance industry. Notable are Fukuyama (1997) and McKenzie (2002) , which compare the efficiency of Japanese firms of both organizational forms. Fukuyama (1997) 
Many people question if the mutual insurance companies are really regulated by the policyholders, arguing that the mutual companies act no differently from stock companies (see Komiya, 1994) . On the other hand, some insist that mutual companies are less efficient because the supervision by policyholders is weaker than that by stockholders. It therefore remains controversial whether or not mutual life insurance companies operate for the advantage of policyholders, or if they only seek profits. We will investigate which situation is the closer to reality by comparing equations (4) and (8).
16 Out of the 20 firms existing in 1997, 16 were mutual companies. In recent years, however, it has been argued that the stock company is a more flexible style of insurance company, and consequently, the mutual companies are examining conversion to stock companies. Daido Life converted to a stock company on April 1, 2002. 17 Note that the surplus is attributed to policyholders of mutual companies. Here we disregard the fact that policyholders change over time, so that the problem of the transfer of the surplus between policyholders emerges. (4) or (8), better describes the behavior of mutual insurance companies. Constructing:
The Estimation Results
(4) is derived when 1 = β , and (8) is derived when 0 = β . Therefore, equations (4) and (8) constitute a non-nested hypothesis.
We apply the double log likelihood ratio test, in which we construct a general specification, i.e., (9), which includes the two equations as nested hypotheses. Then, we conduct two likelihood ratio tests, (4) against (9), and (8) against (9), and compare the results. The estimation method used is three-stage least squares. 18 The test results are presented in Table 1 .
When mutual companies are taken as samples, the specification that they maximize dividends plus profits is rejected at the 1% significance level, whilst the hypothesis that they maximize profits is not rejected. The same results are obtained when the stock companies are taken as 18 The instrumental variables are , , samples, as we expected. Thus, we conclude that both mutual and stock companies seek only profits, rather than dividends plus profits. The behavior of these two types of company does not differ, at least with respect to their objectives.
The results of the basic analysis
Given the results of the former subsection, we conduct the following analyses assuming that both mutual and the stock companies maximize their profits. We define the two models that we wish to estimate. The first model, described by equations (3) and (4), shall henceforth be called the estimation of the degree of non-competition. The second model, given by equations (3) and (7), will be called the estimation of the degree of collusion.
The result of the three-stage least squares estimation of the degree of non-competition is shown in Table 2 . 19 The model fits well since the determination coefficient of equation (4) is over 0.99 and that of the translog cost function (3) is 0.90.
In the estimation of first order condition (4), the coefficients of group insurance and saving insurance are significantly positive, implying that companies with more of these insurances tend to earn more revenues. On the other hand, are not significant in the cost function, implying that these variables do not affect costs. , which appears in both (3) and (4), is positive and highly significant and the are all positive; 28 of the 52 are significant at the 5% level. However, the coefficients of and and their squared terms are all insignificant. This is probably because yearly data only are available for these variables. Table 3 presents the estimation results of the degree of collusion. The coefficient of group insurance has a significantly negative sign in this case, whilst that of saving insurance has a positive sign in equation (7). The former is a different result from that in Table 2 , but the sign is not known a priori. Group insurance has a significant negative coefficient in the cost function as expected, whereas that of saving insurance is insignificant. Notably is positive and highly significant. Estimates of are all positive, and 34 of the 46 are significant at the 5% level. Estimates of the degree of collusion t α are close to unity and highly significant, implying that the market was close to perfect collusion and Cournot competition is rejected. Estimates of demand elasticity t η are also close to unity and decrease over the sample period.
The estimates of the degree of collusion α t are depicted in Figure 7 together with their 95% confidence interval. α t remains almost at the same level around unity until 1991, and then falls sharply, reaching 0.7 in 2002. The degree of collusion does not reject perfect 20 In this estimation, we assume that six firms that existed for only two years of our sample period have the same firm-specific intercepts and firm-specific slopes as each other in order to avoid the problems of the singularities of the data and derivatives. However, the fact that monopoly is rejected might contradict the result that perfect collusion prevailed until 1994. The pattern of the graphs shows that the degree of non-competition was almost constant around 0.35 until 1991, which is consistent with the observed degree of collusion. However, the degree of non-competition is seen to have been stagnant after 1996.
This agrees with Figure 6 and differs from that of the degree of collusion.
We are not sure which pattern is correct a priori. However, considering that various policy measures were taken that related to the failure of insurance companies, the results indicating that competition improved consecutively after 1995, the pattern of collusion, best fit our intuition.
Causes of the progress in competitiveness
In this subsection, let us try to find out how the degree of collusion and degree of non-competition depend on the various elements. Here, we consider the effect of deregulation, i.e., the promulgation of the Insurance Law and the change of policy that ended the convoy system and allowed the failure of insurance firms. In addition, we consider the variables representing business condition (composite index) and market concentration (Herfindahl index).
The regression equation is
Here, CIX is the composite index, HI is the Herfindahl index, DIL is a dummy variable that represents the revision of the Insurance Industry Law, which takes the value 1 in 1995 and 1996, and 0 otherwise, and DFAIL is a dummy variable that represents the failure of insurance companies, which takes the value 1 in the fiscal years 1997-2000, and 0 otherwise.
If these new policies have a significant effect on competition, A 3 and A 4 are negative. We cannot predict the sign of business conditions a priori. The coefficient of the Herfindahl index will be positive if the structure-performance hypothesis applies, and negative if the efficient-structure hypothesis is the case (Demsetz, 1973 , Berger, 1995 .
The estimation results are presented in Table 4 . In the left columns, the results for the degree of collusion are shown. The coefficient of composite index is significantly positive, implying that competition was more lax than when business conditions were better. The coefficient of the Herfindahl index is significantly negative, supporting the efficient-structure hypothesis. Herfindahl index rose after 1995 because the insurance companies became more efficient. A 3 and A 4 , which represent the effect of policy measures, are negative, implying that these changes in policy really promoted competition.
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In the middle and right columns, we show the results of η λ / and λ , respectively. Here, we calculate λ using the value of η in the estimation of the degree of collusion. They confirm the results based on α except that the business condition does not affect competition in the case of λ and η λ / . Thus, we conclude that the recent deregulation policy, including the revision of the insurance law and the abolition of the convoy administration, made the insurance industry more competitive.
Comparison with the pre-war period
It is said that in the pre-war period, the competition amongst life insurance companies was quite severe (Tsutsui et al., 2004) . Premium and dividend rates were not regulated until 1937, nor was sales staff activity (in terms of insurance solicitation) restricted until 1931. Insurance companies tried to mitigate competition by means of different premium-dividend schemes in 1917 -1937 (Tsutsui et al., 2000 .
It is interesting to investigate, therefore, whether the current degree of competition is as great as that in the pre-war period. We estimated the degree of non-competition and degree of collusion using cross-section data for 1916, 1917, and 1922 , when the competition was quite fierce. It was not necessary to include and because the regression is cross-sectional, and and were omitted from our estimations because of the unavailability of data.
In Figure 7 , we show the degree of collusion for those years. It is about 0.5 and lower than for recent years, suggesting that the current competition is still weaker than during the pre-war period. 21 Revision of the Insurance Industry Law induced a remarkable increase in the number of firms, so that we estimated eq. (10) replacing DIL with the net change in their number. The coefficient was negative, but the p value was only 15%. We also estimated eq. (10) replacing DFAIL with the asset value of the companies in default. The coefficient was negative, but insignificant.
The degree of non-competition for the pre-war years is shown in Figure 6 . These values are around 0.19 and slightly higher than that for the current years. However, since the degree of non-competition is divided by demand elasticity, and since it is not convincing to assume this elasticity to have been the same for the pre-and post-war periods, we should not directly compare these values. Let us therefore adopt the value of t η for the estimation of the degree of collusion and multiply these estimates to get t λ . The result is shown in Figure 8 . t λ in 2002 is 0.15, whilst it is 0.134 in 1916, suggesting that the current competition is almost at the level that was attained during the pre-war period.
Which result, Figure 7 or Figure 8 , is more appropriate with regard to the level of competition? The suggestion that the current competition is as severe as that which occurred in the pre-war period when there were no particular policies that would restrict competition is not very convincing. In this regard, the collusion result appears to be the more reliable.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the change in the degree of competition existing in the Japanese life insurance industry for the 1986-2002 period. Firstly, we investigated whether Japanese life insurance companies of both stock and mutual structure seek profits or dividends.
Then, estimating the first order condition of the profit maximization, together with the cost function, we obtained estimates of the degree of non-competition and collusion. We also sought the causes of progress in competition and compared the competitiveness with that of the pre-war period. The conclusions we obtained from the estimation results are summarized as follows:
1) Both stock and mutual companies seek to maximize profits rather than dividends to policyholders.
2) The degree of non-competition fell until 1996, and has remained almost unchanged thereafter. It fell particularly sharply in 1995 and 1996, when the new Insurance Industry Law was promulgated and enforced.
3) The estimation of the degree of collusion reveals that competition has improved monotonically since 1992. The degree of collusion does not reject perfect collusion until 1994, but rejects it thereafter.
4) The degree of collusion has improved following policy changes such as the revision of the Insurance Industry Law and the abolition of the convoy system, since which the failure of insurance companies has been admitted. The Herfindahl index has a positive correlation with the degree of competition, as the efficient-structure hypothesis predicts.
5) The degree of collusion in the later years is greater than that for the pre-war period, suggesting that there remains room for more competition.
Let us compare the results of this paper with those available for the competitiveness of the other Japanese financial industries. Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) , using an approach similar to the one applied in this paper, considered the Japanese banking industry and estimated the degree of competition from 1974 to 2000. They found that the market had become more competitive in the 1970s, and judged that the city banks faced perfect competition in the middle of the 1990s.
Estimating Panzar-Rosse's H-statistic, Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005) found that the Japanese securities industry was in monopolistic competition equilibrium in the 1980s and late 1990s
and was in monopoly equilibrium in the early 1990s. In view of these findings, life insurance in Japan seems to be a less competitive industry than banking. Competition in banking improved in the late 1970s. Whereas it improved in the life insurance sector during the late 1990s, it did not reach perfect competition. (4) and (8) represent models of the maximization of profits and the maximization of dividends plus profits, respectively. (9) is a general specification that includes (4) and (8) 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 15 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 40 1916 1917 1922 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 4 1916 1917 1922 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Year the upper bounds of a 95% confidence interval the lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval 40 1916 1917 1922 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Year the upper bounds of a 95% confidence interval the lower bounds of a 95% confidence interval 1/n Note: t λ is calculated by multiplying t η taken from the estimation of collusion with the estimates of t t η λ / shown in Figure 6 . Line of 1/n corresponds to Cournot oligopoly.
